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This is a Bombshell: Now that Dr Montagnier, French Nobel Prize of medecine on the HIV virus has confirmed that the Wuhan coronavirus genome contains HIV sequences in addition to the S protein, it is time for China to come clean and admit that these research were indeed being conducted in Wuhan and that the virus escaped from the laboratory.
Here's the interview. (in French unfortunately)
#wuhancoronavirus#wuhanvirus#breakingnews#chinacoronavirus#china#HIV#coronavirus#coronaviruswho
This is a superb article from Michel Every at Rabobank which explains the Eurodollar financial market and summarize the risks it represents for the world economy. Could the Eurodollar be the cause of the breakdown of our financial system? Quite possible and even likely! Read on!
Submitted to Zerohedge by Michael Every of Rabobank / April12, 2020 https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/down-rabbit-hole-eurodollar-market-matrix-behind-it-all
Summary
The Eurodollar system is a critical but often misunderstood
driver of global financial markets: its importance cannot be
understated.
Its origins are shrouded in mystery and intrigue; its operations
are invisible to most; and yet it controls us in many ways. We will
attempt to enlighten readers on what it is and what it means.
However, it is also a system under huge structural pressures – and
as such we may be about to experience a profound paradigm shift with key
implications for markets, economies, and geopolitics.
Recent Fed actions on swap lines and repo facilities only underline this fact rather than reducing its likelihood
What is The Matrix?
A new world-class golf course in an Asian country financed with a USD
bank loan. A Mexican property developer buying a hotel in USD. A
European pension company wanting to hold USD assets and swapping
borrowed EUR to do so. An African retailer importing Chinese-made toys
for sale, paying its invoice in USD.
All of these are small examples of the multi-faceted global
Eurodollar market. Like The Matrix, it is all around us, and connects
us. Also just like The Matrix, most are unaware of its existence even as
it defines the parameters we operate within. As we shall explore in
this special report, it is additionally a Matrix that encompasses an
implicit power struggle that only those who grasp its true nature are
cognizant of.
Moreover, at present this Matrix and its Architect face a huge, perhaps existential, challenge.
Yes, it has overcome similar crises before...but it might be that the Novel (or should we say ‘Neo’?) Coronavirus is The One.
So, here is the key question to start with: What is the Eurodollar system?
For Neo-phytes
The Eurodollar system is a critical but often misunderstood driver of global financial markets: its importance cannot be understated. While
most market participants are aware of its presence to some degree, not
many grasp the extent to which it impacts on markets, economies,…and
geopolitics - indeed, the latter is particularly underestimated.
Yet before we go down that particular rabbit hole, let’s start with the basics. In its simplest form, a Eurodollar is an unsecured USD deposit held outside of the US. They are not under the US’ legal jurisdiction, nor are they subject to US rules and regulations.
To avoid any potential confusion, the term Eurodollar came into being
long before the Euro currency, and the “euro” has nothing to do with
Europe. In this context it is used in the same vein as Eurobonds, which
are also not EUR denominated bonds, but rather debt issued in a
different currency to the company of that issuing. For example, a
Samurai bond--that is to say a bond issued in JPY by a nonJapanese
issuer--is also a type of Eurobond.
As with Eurobonds, eurocurrencies can reflect many different
underlying real currencies. In fact, one could talk about a Euroyen, for
JPY, or even a Euroeuro, for EUR. Yet the Eurodollar dwarfs them: we
shall show the scale shortly.
More(pheous) background So how did the Eurodollar system come to be, and how has it grown into the behemoth it is today? Like all global systems, there are many conspiracy theories and fantastical claims that surround the birth of the Eurodollar market. While some of these stories may have a grain of truth, we will try and stick to the known facts.
A number of parallel events occurred in the late 1950s that led to
the Eurodollar’s creation – and the likely suspects sound like the cast
of a spy novel. The Eurodollar market began to emerge after WW2, when US
Dollars held outside of the US began to increase as the US consumed
more and more goods from overseas. Some also cite the role of the
Marshall Plan, where the US transferred over USD12bn (USD132bn
equivalent now) to Western Europe to help them rebuild and fight the
appeal of Soviet communism.
Of course, these were just USD outside of the US and not Eurodollars.
Where the plot thickens is that, increasingly, the foreign recipients
of USD became concerned that the US might use its own currency as a
power play. As the Cold War bit, Communist countries became particularly
concerned about the safety of their USD held with US banks. After all,
the US had used its financial power for geopolitical gains when in 1956,
in response to the British invading Egypt during the Suez Crisis, it
had threatened to intensify the pressure on GBP’s peg to USD under
Bretton Woods: this had forced the British into a humiliating withdrawal
and an acceptance that their status of Great Power was not compatible
with their reduced economic and financial circumstances.
With rising fears that the US might freeze the Soviet Union’s USD
holdings, action was taken: in 1957, the USSR moved their USD holdings
to a bank in London, creating the first Eurodollar deposit and seeding
our current UScentric global financial system – by a country opposed to
the US in particular and capitalism in general.
There are also alternative origin stories. Some claim the first
Eurodollar deposit was made during the Korean War with China moving USD
to a Parisian bank.
Meanwhile, the Eurodollar market spawned a widely-known financial
instrument, the London Inter Bank Offer Rate, or LIBOR. Indeed, LIBOR is
an offshore USD interest rate which emerged in the 1960s as those that
borrowed Eurodollars needed a reference rate for larger loans that might
need to be syndicated. Unlike today, however, LIBOR was an average of
offered lending rates, hence the name, and was not based on actual
transactions as the first tier of the LIBOR submission waterfall is
today.
Dozer and Tank
So how large is the Eurodollar market today? Like the Matrix - vast.
As with the origins of the Eurodollar system, itself nothing is
transparent. However, we have tried to estimate an indicative total
using Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data for:
On-balance sheet USD liabilities held by non-US banks;
USD Credit commitments, guarantees extended, and derivatives contracts of non-US banks (C, G, D);
USD debt liabilities of non-US non-financial corporations;
Over-the-Counter (OTC) USD derivative claims of non-US non-financial corporations; and
Global goods imports in USD excluding those of the US and intra-Eurozone trade.
The results are as shown below as of end-2018: USD57 trillion, nearly three times the size of the US economy before it was hit by the COVID-19 virus. Even if this measure is not complete, it underlines the scale of the market.
It also shows its vast power in that this is an equally large structural global demand for USD. Every import, bond, loan, credit guarantee, or derivate needs to be settled in USD.
Indeed, fractional reserve banking means that an initial Eurodollar
can be multiplied up (e.g., Eurodollar 100m can be used as the base for a
larger Eurodollar loan, and leverage increased further). Yet non-US
entities are NOT able to conjure up USD on demand when needed because
they don’t have a central bank behind them which can produce USD by
fiat, which only the Federal Reserve can. This power to create the USD that everyone else transacts and trades in is an essential point to grasp on the Eurodollar – which is ironically also why it was created in the first place!
Tri-ffi-nity
Given the colourful history, ubiquitous nature, and critical
importance of the Eurodollar market, a second question then arises: Why don’t people know about The Matrix?
The answer is easy: because once one is aware of it, one immediately wishes to have taken the Blue Pill instead.
Consider what the logic of the Eurodollar system implies. Global
financial markets and the global economy rely on the common standard of
the USD for pricing, accounting, trading, and deal making. Imagine a
world with a hundred different currencies – or even a dozen: it would be
hugely problematic to manage, and would not allow anywhere near the
level of integration we currently enjoy.
However, at root the Eurodollar system is based on using the national
currency of just one country, the US, as the global reserve currency.
This means the world is beholden to a currency that it cannot create as needed.
When a crisis hits, as at present, everyone in the Eurodollar system
suddenly realizes they have no ability to create fiat USD and must rely
on national USD FX reserves and/or Fed swap lines that allow them to
swap local currency for USD for a period. This obviously grants the US enormous power and privilege. The world is also beholden to US monetary policy cycles
rather than local ones: higher US rates and/or a stronger USD are
ruinous for countries that have few direct economic or financial links
with the US. Yet the US Federal Reserve generally shows very
little interest in global economic conditions – though that is starting
to change, as we will show shortly.
A second problem is that the flow of USD from the US to the
rest of the world needs to be sufficient to meet the inbuilt demand for
trade and other transactions. Yet the US is a relatively
smaller slice of the global economy with each passing year. Even so, it
must keep USD flowing out or else a global Eurodollar liquidity crisis
will inevitably occur.
That means that either the US must run large capital account
deficits, lending to the rest of the world; or large current account
deficits, spending instead.
Obviously, the US has been running the latter for many decades, and
in many ways benefits from it. It pays for goods and services from the
rest of the world in USD debt that it can just create. As such it can
also run huge publicor private-sector deficits – arguably even with the
multitrillion USD fiscal deficits we are about to see.
However, there is a cost involved for the US. Running a persistent current-account deficit implies a net outflow of industry, manufacturing and related jobs. The
US has obviously experienced this for a generation, and it has led to
both structural inequality and, more recently, a backlash of political
populism wanting to Make America Great Again.
Indeed, if one understands the structure of the Eurodollar system one can see that it faces the Triffin Paradox.
This was an argument first made by Robert Triffin in 1959 when he
correctly predicted that any country forced to adopt the role of global
reserve currency would also be forced to run ever-larger currency
outflows to fuel foreign appetite – eventually leading to the breakdown
of the system as the cost became too much to bear.
Moreover, there is another systemic weakness at play: realpolitik. Atrophying
of industry undermines the supply chains needed for the defence sector,
with critical national security implications. The US is
already close to losing the ability to manufacture the wide range of
products its powerful armed forces require on scale and at speed:
yet without military supremacy the US cannot long maintain its
multi-dimensional global power, which also stands behind the USD and the
Eurodollar system.
This implies the US needs to adopt (military-) industrial policy and a
more protectionist stance to maintain its physical power – but that
could limit the flow of USD into the global economy via trade. Again,
the Eurodollar system, like the early utopian version of the Matrix,
seems to contain the seeds of its own destruction.
Indeed, look at the Eurodollar logically over the long term and there
are only three ways such a system can ultimately resolve itself:
The US walks away from the USD reserve currency burden, as
Triffin said, or others lose faith in it to stand behind the deficits it
needs to run to keep USD flowing appropriately;
The US Federal Reserve takes over the global financial system little by little and/or in bursts; or
The global financial system fragments as the US asserts primacy
over parts of it, leaving the rest to make their own arrangements.
See the Eurodollar system like this, and it was always when and
not if a systemic crisis occurs – which is why people prefer not focus
on it all even when it matters so much. Yet arguably this underlying geopolitical dynamic is playing out during our present virus-prompted global financial instability. Down the rabbit hole
But back to the rabbit hole that is our present situation. While
the Eurodollar market is enormous one also needs to look at how many
USD are circulating around the world outside the US that can service it
if needed. In this regard we will look specifically at global USD FX reserves.
It’s true we could also include US cash holdings in the offshore
private sector. Given that US banknotes cannot be tracked no firm data
are available, but estimates range from 40% - 72% of total USD cash
actually circulates outside the country. This potentially totals
hundreds of billions of USD that de facto operate as Eurodollars.
However, given it is an unknown total, and also largely sequestered in
questionable cash-based activities, and hence are hopefully outside the
banking system, we prefer to stick with centralbank FX reserves. Looking at the ratio of Eurodollar liabilities to global USD
FX reserve assets, the picture today is actually healthier than it was a
few years ago.
Indeed, while the Eurodollar market size has remained relatively
constant in recent years, largely as banks have been slow to expand
their balance sheets, the level of global USD FX reserves has risen from
USD1.9 trillion to over USD6.5 trillion. As such, the ratio of
structural global USD demand to that of USD supply has actually declined
from near 22 during the global financial crisis to around 9.
Yet the current market is clearly seeing major Eurodollar stresses – verging on panic.
Fundamentally, the Eurodollar system is always short USD, and any
loss of confidence sees everyone scramble to access them at once – in
effect causing an invisible international bank run. Indeed, the
Eurodollar market only works when it is a constant case of
“You-Roll-Over Dollar”.
Unfortunately, COVID-19 and its huge economic damage and uncertainty
mean that global confidence has been smashed, and our Eurodollar Matrix
risks buckling as a result.
The wild gyrations recently experienced in even major global FX
crosses speak to that point, to say nothing of the swings seen in more
volatile currencies such as AUD, and in EM bellwethers such as MXN and
ZAR. FX basis swaps and LIBOR vs. Fed Funds (so offshore vs. onshore USD
borrowing rates) say the same thing. Unsurprisingly, the IMF are seeing
a wide range of countries turning to them for emergency USD loans.
The Fed has, of course, stepped up. It has reduced the cost of
accessing existing USD swap lines--where USD are exchanged for other
currencies for a period of time--for the Bank of Canada, Bank of
England, European Central Bank, and Swiss National Bank; and another
nine countries were given access to Fed swap lines with Australia,
Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, Singapore, and Sweden all able to tap up to
USD60bn, and USD30bn available to Denmark, Norway, and New Zealand.
This alleviates some pressure for some markets – but is a drop in the
ocean compared to the level of Eurodollar liabilities.
The Fed has also introduced a new FIMA repo facility. Essentially
this allows any central bank, including emerging markets, to swap their
US Treasury holdings for USD, which can then be made available to local
financial institutions. To put it bluntly, this repo facility is like a
swap line but with a country whose currency you don't trust.
Allowing a country to swap its Treasuries for USD can alleviate some
of the immediate stress on Eurodollars, but when the swap needs to be
reversed the drain on reserves will still be there. Moreover, Eurodollar
market participants will now not be able to see if FX reserves are
declining in a potential crisis country. Ironically, that is likely to see less, not more, willingness to extend Eurodollar credit as a result.
You have two choices, Neo
Yet despite all the Fed’s actions so far, USD keeps going up vs. EM
FX. Again, this is as clear an example as one could ask for of
structural underlying Eurodollar demand.
Indeed, we arguably need to see even more steps taken by the Fed – and soon. To
underline the scale of the crisis we currently face in the Eurodollar
system, the BIS concluded at the end of a recent publication on the
matter:
“...today’s crisis differs from the 2008 GFC, and requires policies
that reach beyond the banking sector to final users. These businesses,
particularly those enmeshed in global supply chains, are in constant
need of working capital, much of it in dollars. Preserving the flow of
payments along these chains is essential if we are to avoid further
economic meltdown.
Channeling dollars to non-banks is not straightforward. Allowing
non-banks to transact with the central bank is one option, but there are
attendant difficulties, both in principle and in practice. Other
options include policies that encourage banks to fill the void left by
market based finance, for example funding for lending schemes that
extend dollars to non-banks indirectly via banks.”
In other words, the BIS is making clear that somebody (i.e., the Fed)
must ensure that Eurodollars are made available on massive scale, not
just to foreign central banks, but right down global USD supply chains.
As they note, there are many practical issues associated with doing that
– and huge downsides if we do not do so. Yet they overlook that there
are huge geopolitical problems linked to this step too.
Notably, if the Fed does so then we move rapidly towards logical
end-game #2 of the three possible Eurodollar outcomes we have listed
previously, where the Fed de facto takes over the global financial system. Yet if the Fed does not do so then we move towards end-game #3, a partial Eurodollar collapse.
Of course, the easy thing to assume is that the Fed will step up as
it has always shown a belated willingness before, and a more proactive
stance of late. Indeed, as the BIS shows in other research, the
Fed stepped up not just during the Global Financial Crisis, but all the
way back to the Eurodollar market of the 1960s, where swap lines were
readily made available on large scale in order to try to reduce periodic
volatility.
However, the scale of what we are talking about here is an entirely
new dimension: potentially tens of trillions of USD, and not just to
other central banks, or to banks, but to a panoply of real economy firms
all around the Eurodollar universe.
As importantly, this assumes that the Fed, which is based in the US,
wants to save all these foreign firms. Yet does the Fed want to help
Chinese firms, for example? It may traditionally be focused narrowly on
smoothly-functioning financial markets, but is that true of a White
House that openly sees China as a “strategic rival”, which wishes to
onshore industry from it, and which has more interest in having a
politically-compliant, not independent Fed? Please think back to the
origins of Eurodollars - or look at how the US squeezed its WW2 ally UK
during the 1956 Suez Crisis, or how it is using the USD financial system
vs. Iran today.
Equally, this assumes that all foreign governments and central banks
will want to see the US and USD/Eurodollar cement their global financial
primacy further. Yes, Fed support will help alleviate this current
economic and brewing financial crisis – but the shift of real power
afterwards would be a Rubicon that we have crossed.
Specifically, would China really be happy to see its hopes of CNY
gaining a larger global role washed away in a flood of fresh, addictive
Eurodollar liquidity, meaning that it is more deeply beholden to the US
central bank? Again, please think back to the origins of Eurodollars, to
Suez, and to how Iran is being treated – because Beijing will. China
would be fully aware that a Fed bailout could easily come with political
strings attached, if not immediately and directly, then eventually and
indirectly. But they would be there all the same. One cannot ignore or underplay this power struggle that lies within the heart of the Eurodollar Matrix. I know you’re out there
So, considering those systemic pressures, let’s look at where
Eurodollar pressures are building most now. We will use World Bank
projections for short-term USD financing plus concomitant USD
current-account deficit requirements vs. specifically USD FX reserves,
not general FX reserves accounted in USD, as calculated by looking at
national USD reserves and adjusting for the USD’s share of the total
global FX reserves basket (57% in 2018, for example). In some cases this
will bias national results up or down, but these are in any case only
indicative.
How to read these data about where the Eurodollar stresses lie in Table 1? Firstly, in terms of scale, Eurodollar
problems lie with China, the UK, Japan, Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands,
Singapore, Canada, and South Korea, Germany and France. Total short-term
USD demand in the economies listed is USD28 trillion – around 130% of
USD GDP. The size of liabilities the Fed would potentially have to cover
in China is enormous at over USD3.4 trillion - should that prove
politically acceptable to either side.
Outside of China, and most so in the Cayman Islands and the UK,
Eurodollar claims are largely in the financial sector and fall on banks
and shadow banks such as insurance companies and pension funds. This is
obviously a clearer line of attack/defence for the Fed. Yet it still
makes these economies vulnerable to swings in Eurodollar confidence -
and reliant on the Fed.
Second, most developed countries apart from Switzerland have opted to
hold almost no USD reserves at all. Their approach is that they are
also reserve currencies, long-standing US allies, and so assume the Fed
will always be willing to treat them as such with swap lines when
needed. That assumption may be correct – but it comes with a
geopolitical power-hierarchy price tag. (Think yet again of how
Eurodollars started and the 1956 Suez Crisis ended.)
Third, most developing countries still do not hold enough USD for periods of Eurodollar liquidity stress,
despite the painful lessons learned in 1997-98 and 2008-09. The only
exception is Saudi Arabia, whose currency is pegged to the USD, although
Taiwan, and Russia hold USD close to what would be required in an
emergency. Despite years of FX reserve accumulation, at the cost of
domestic consumption and a huge US trade deficit, Indonesia, Mexico,
Malaysia, and Turkey are all still vulnerable to Eurodollar funding
pressures. In short, there is an argument to save yet more USD – which
will increase Eurodollar demand further.
We all become Agent Smith?
In short, the extent of demand for USD outside of the US is clear –
and so far the Fed is responding. It has continued to expand its balance
sheet to provide liquidity to the markets, and it has never done so at
this pace before (Figure 5). In fact, in just a month the Fed has
expanded its balance sheet by nearly 50% of the previous expansion
observed during all three rounds of QE implemented after the Global
Financial Crisis. Essentially we have seen nearly five years of QE1-3 in five weeks! And yet it isn’t enough.
Moreover, things are getting worse, not better. The global economic
impact of COVID-19 is only beginning but one thing is abundantly clear –
global trade in goods and services is going to be hit very, very hard,
and that US imports are going to tumble. This threatens one of the main
USD liquidity channels into the Eurodollar system.
Table 2 above also underlines looming EM Eurodollar stress-points in
terms of import cover, which will fall sharply as USD earnings collapse,
and external debt service. The further to the left we see the latest
point for import cover, and the further to the right we see it for
external debt, the greater the potential problems ahead.
As such, the Fed is likely to find it needs to cover
trillions more in Eurodollar liabilities (of what underlying quality?)
coming due in the real global, not financial economy – which is exactly
what the BIS are warning about. Yes, we are seeing such radical
steps being taken by central banks in some Western countries, including
in the US - but internationally too? Are we all to become ‘Agent
Smith’?
If the Fed is to step up to this challenge and expand its
balance sheet even further/faster, then the US economy will massively
expand its external deficit to mirror it. That is already happening. What was a USD1 trillion
fiscal deficit before COVID-19, to the dismay of some, has expanded to
USD3.2 trillion via a virus-fighting package: and when tax revenues
collapse, it will be far larger. Add a further USD600bn phase three
stimulus, and talk of a USD2 trillion phase four infrastructure program
to try to jumpstart growth rather than just fight virus fires, and
potentially we are talking about a fiscal deficit in the range of 20-25%
of GDP. As we argued recently, that is a peak-WW2 level as this is also
a world war of sorts.
On one hand, the Eurodollar market will happily snap up those
trillions US Treasuries/USD – at least those they can access, because
the Fed will be buying them too via QE. Indeed, for now bond yields are
not rising and USD still is.
However, such fiscal action will prompt questions on how much
the USD can be ‘debased’ before, like Agent Smith, it over-reaches and
then implodes or explodes – the first of the logical endpoints for the Eurodollar system, if you recall. (Of course, other currencies are doing it too.)
Is Neo The One?
In conclusion, the origins of the Eurodollar Matrix are shrouded in
mystery and intrigue – and yet are worth knowing. Its operations are
invisible to most but control us in many ways – so are worth
understanding. Moreover, it is a system under huge structural pressure –
which we must now recognise.
It’s easy to ignore all these issues and just hope the Eurodollar
Matrix remains the “You-Roll-Dollar” market – but can that be true
indefinitely based just on one’s belief?
Is the Neo Coronavirus ‘The One’ that breaks it?
_______________________________________________________________
ORACLE: “Well now, ain’t this a surprise?”
ARCHITECT: “You’ve played a very dangerous game.”
ORACLE: “Change always is.”
ARCHITECT: “And how long do you think this peace is going to last?”
ORACLE: “As long as it can….What about the others?”
ARCHITECT: “What others?”
ORACLE: “The ones that want out.”
ARCHITECT: “Obviously they will be freed.”
The artificial origin of the Wuhan Corona Virus is now clear.
In spite of Chinese propaganda to the contrary, ALL the assumptions we made two months ago about the virus have been confirmed as the video below makes clear.
The virus escape from the P4 laboratory was an accident, but the research being done was not. The consequences will be far reaching.
(PS: To view the video, click on the YouTube link below. The video is too large to embed in the article. The first part of the documentary, the research side is the most interesting. The second part is political. It veers toward anti communist propaganda and is much less interesting.)
Most European governments completely misread the epidemic although they had time to learn from the Chinese experience.
First they misunderstood exponentials, (it starts slowly then goes up
fast) and did nothing. Then they over-reacted looking at models saying
half the population would get sick with 3% dying and finally settled on
the only option left: "Flatten the curve!" The result is that in a month
or two, a large chunk of the economy will be gone. There will be hell
to pay. Confinement and the dictatorial measures which come together
will not be tolerated very long in many countries. The 4th turning is
upon us!
But for now, that is indeed the only option left. Here is a good brief https://phys.org/news/2020-03-endgame-restart-coronavirus.html Here is the complete original statistical work from the Imperial College in London: (The link seems to be broken so I insert a copy of the summary, pdf below) Impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce COVID-19 mortality and healthcare demand Neil M Ferguson, Daniel Laydon, Gemma Nedjati-Gilani, Natsuko Imai, Kylie Ainslie, Marc Baguelin, Sangeeta Bhatia, Adhiratha Boonyasiri, Zulma Cucunubá, Gina Cuomo-Dannenburg, Amy Dighe, Ilaria Dorigatti, Han Fu, Katy Gaythorpe, Will Green, Arran Hamlet, Wes Hinsley, Lucy C Okell, Sabine van Elsland, Hayley Thompson, Robert Verity, Erik Volz, Haowei Wang, Yuanrong Wang, Patrick GT Walker, Peter Winskill, Charles Whittaker, Christl A Donnelly, Steven Riley, Azra C Ghani. On behalf of the Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Modelling MRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis Abdul Latif Jameel Institute for Disease and Emergency Analytics Imperial College London Correspondence: neil.ferguson@imperial.ac.uk Summary The global impact of COVID-19 has been profound, and the public health threat it represents is the most serious seen in a respiratory virus since the 1918 H1N1 influenza pandemic. Here we present the results of epidemiological modelling which has informed policymaking in the UK and other countries in recent weeks. In the absence of a COVID-19 vaccine, we assess the potential role of a number of public health measures – so-called non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) – aimed at reducing contact rates in the population and thereby reducing transmission of the virus. In the results presented here, we apply a previously published microsimulation model to two countries: the UK (Great Britain specifically) and the US. We conclude that the effectiveness of any one intervention in isolation is likely to be limited, requiring multiple interventions to be combined to have a substantial impact on transmission. Two fundamental strategies are possible: (a) mitigation, which focuses on slowing but not necessarily stopping epidemic spread – reducing peak healthcare demand while protecting those most at risk of severe disease from infection, and (b) suppression, which aims to reverse epidemic growth, reducing case numbers to low levels and maintaining that situation indefinitely. Each policy has major challenges. We find that that optimal mitigation policies (combining home isolation of suspect cases, home quarantine of those living in the same household as suspect cases, and social distancing of the elderly and others at most risk of severe disease) might reduce peak healthcare demand by 2/3 and deaths by half. However, the resulting mitigated epidemic would still likely result in hundreds of thousands of deaths and health systems (most notably intensive care units) being overwhelmed many times over. For countries able to achieve it, this leaves suppression as the preferred policy option. We show that in the UK and US context, suppression will minimally require a combination of social distancing of the entire population, home isolation of cases and household quarantine of their family members. This may need to be supplemented by school and university closures, though it should be recognised that such closures may have negative impacts on health systems due to increased 16 March 2020 Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team absenteeism. The major challenge of suppression is that this type of intensive intervention package – or something equivalently effective at reducing transmission – will need to be maintained until a vaccine becomes available (potentially 18 months or more) – given that we predict that transmission will quickly rebound if interventions are relaxed. We show that intermittent social distancing – triggered by trends in disease surveillance – may allow interventions to be relaxed temporarily in relative short time windows, but measures will need to be reintroduced if or when case numbers rebound. Last, while experience in China and now South Korea show that suppression is possible in the short term, it remains to be seen whether it is possible long-term, and whether the social and economic costs of the interventions adopted thus far can be reduced. 16 March 2020 Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team
Introduction The COVID-19 pandemic is now a major global health threat. As of 16th March 2020, there have been 164,837 cases and 6,470 deaths confirmed worldwide. Global spread has been rapid, with 146 countries now having reported at least one case. The last time the world responded to a global emerging disease epidemic of the scale of the current COVID-19 pandemic with no access to vaccines was the 1918-19 H1N1 influenza pandemic. In that pandemic, some communities, notably in the United States (US), responded with a variety of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) - measures intended to reduce transmission by reducing contact rates in the general population1. Examples of the measures adopted during this time included closing schools, churches, bars and other social venues. Cities in which these interventions were implemented early in the epidemic were successful at reducing case numbers while the interventions remained in place and experienced lower mortality overall1. However, transmission rebounded once controls were lifted. Whilst our understanding of infectious diseases and their prevention is now very different compared to in 1918, most of the countries across the world face the same challenge today with COVID-19, a virus with comparable lethality to H1N1 influenza in 1918. Two fundamental strategies are possible2: (a) Suppression. Here the aim is to reduce the reproduction number (the average number of secondary cases each case generates), R, to below 1 and hence to reduce case numbers to low levels or (as for SARS or Ebola) eliminate human-to-human transmission. The main challenge of this approach is that NPIs (and drugs, if available) need to be maintained – at least intermittently - for as long as the virus is circulating in the human population, or until a vaccine becomes available. In the case of COVID-19, it will be at least a 12-18 months before a vaccine is available3. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that initial vaccines will have high efficacy. (b) Mitigation. Here the aim is to use NPIs (and vaccines or drugs, if available) not to interrupt transmission completely, but to reduce the health impact of an epidemic, akin to the strategy adopted by some US cities in 1918, and by the world more generally in the 1957, 1968 and 2009 influenza pandemics. In the 2009 pandemic, for instance, early supplies of vaccine were targeted at individuals with pre-existing medical conditions which put them at risk of more severe disease4. In this scenario, population immunity builds up through the epidemic, leading to an eventual rapid decline in case numbers and transmission dropping to low levels. The strategies differ in whether they aim to reduce the reproduction number, R, to below 1 (suppression) – and thus cause case numbers to decline – or to merely slow spread by reducing R, but not to below 1. In this report, we consider the feasibility and implications of both strategies for COVID-19, looking at a range of NPI measures. It is important to note at the outset that given SARS-CoV-2 is a newly emergent virus, much remains to be understood about its transmission. In addition, the impact of many of the NPIs detailed here depends critically on how people respond to their introduction, which is highly likely to vary between countries and even communities. Last, it is highly likely that there would be significant spontaneous changes in population behaviour even in the absence of government-mandated interventions. 16 March 2020 Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team
This is one of the most important chart to consider in order to
understand how different countries will fare against the Corona virus.
From this, it is very clear that Asian countries are doing relatively
well fighting the virus, European ones not so much. This will have
consequences and may end up speeding up Asia's rise and conversely
Europe's decline.
Understanding this trend from the Chinese data early on would have been extremely useful for the rest of the world. We lost about a month. From this data, a month is about two factors, so we can now expect that the Corona pandemic will be about 100 times larger than it should have been!
The progress of haptic technology are stunning! They offer the possibility to control complex layers of information in a easy and intuitive way, provided we work out intelligent interface. This is the next stage of technology where a whole virtual world will be created offering natural interaction and optimal control. But to really take off, this "world" need to be more secure than the current IoT, therefore probably based on blockchain technology, both distributed and decentralized, the opposite of the current trend. Privacy and people need to be placed back at the center of technological development. The alternative is a smart city for robots controlled by computers with no room left for humans.
Creating a data catalog may indeed be the easiest way to understand and access data in a company. A data catalog is not about the data itself but about organizing meta-data. It is this organization which will eventually constitute the backbone of the database structure and efficient organization. Well worth a read, it only to understand better what is possible! #Data #Database #SQL #CRM #Datalake #Datawarehouse
A rather interesting introduction to anomaly detection. Clear and instructive. This can have many applications beyond "vision" as the principle can be applied to all kind of data. #data#ML#database#machinelearning#machinelearningalgorithms https://www.pyimagesearch.com/2020/01/20/intro-to-anomaly-detection-with-opencv-computer-vision-and-scikit-learn/
